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Profiling for Reemployment Bonus Offers
During the 1980s, field experiments were conducted in four states to evaluate the
potential of using cash bonus offers to induce early return to work by unemployment insurance
(UI) claimants. The first experiment was initiated by the Illinois Employment Security
Department and was designed with the assistance of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research. It yielded encouraging results, which led the U.S. Department of Labor to include a
somewhat different bonus treatment in a New Jersey reemployment experiment.
Although the evidence from New Jersey was not positive, the Labor Department
sponsored multi-treatment experiments in Pennsylvania and Washington in an attempt to refine
the findings from Illinois. Funding for the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments came from
money that Congress earmarked in 1987 to investigate methods for promoting reemployment of
workers dislocated by structural change in the economy. Results from these experiments did not
support the idea that the reemployment bonus could be a cost-effective way to promote rapid
reemployment, and policy momentum for this bonus idea faded.
In 1994 and 1995, new mechanisms for early identification of UI beneficiaries who are
likely to have long jobless spells were implemented in all states as a result of federal law. These
mechanisms, called profiling models, are currently being used by states as a means to target
early reemployment assistance to dislocated workers. They offer a natural means for also
targeting reemployment bonus offers. This article summarizes recent research findings which
suggest that such targeting may appreciably improve the cost-effectiveness of the bonus.
The Bonus Experiments
The first reemployment bonus experiment, conducted in Illinois during 1984-85, offered
a $500 reemployment bonus to UI claimants for returning to work within 11 weeks and staying
employed at least 4 months. The bonus reduced duration of UI-compensated unemployment by
more than a week and saved much more in UI benefit payments than it cost for bonus payments
and administration of the bonus offer (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
The reemployment bonus offer in the 1985-86 New Jersey experiment also had a 4month reemployment requirement, but it had a 12-week qualification period and a bonus amount
which decreased as the duration of insured unemployment lengthened. The New Jersey
experiment raised questions about the benefits to the UI system from such a bonus offer (Corson
et al. 1989).
The states of Pennsylvania and Washington each conducted separate reemployment
bonus experiments in 1988-89 involving a total of 11 different treatments (Table 1). These
treatments were intended to supplement the information from the Illinois experiment by
identifying which bonus amount and qualification period was most effective. Among the five
treatments in Pennsylvania and six treatments in Washington, only four were cost-effective from

the perspective of the UI system (Decker and O'Leary 1995).
Table 1

Treatment
(bonus amt.,
qualif. period)

Impacts on UI payments of
Reemployment Bonus Offers with
and without Profiling ($ paid per
claimant)
Full
sample

Top 50
percent

Top 25
percent

Pennsylvania
Low bonus,
short period

-103**

35

182

Low bonus,
long period

-69**

-211*

-159

High bonus,
short period

-99*

5

-99

High bonus,
long period

-130**

-261**

-199

-61

-292**

-231

Declining
bonus

Washington
Low bonus,
short period

22

-47

-78

Low bonus,
long period

-112**

-187**

-142

Medium bonus,
short period

-29

-121

-143

Medium bonus,
long period

-44

-33

12

High bonus,
short period

-117**

-126

-135

High bonus,
long period

-136**

-228**

-280**

* Statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
Pennsylvania bonus amount: low = 3 x WBA (weekly benefit amount); high = 6 x WBA; declining = half the remaining UI entitlement, with the
initial offer good for 2 weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week.
Pennsylvania qualification period: short = 6 weeks; long = 12 weeks.
Washington bonus amount: low = 2 x WBA; medium = 4 x WBA; high = 6 x WBA.
Washington qualification period: short = 0.2 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week; long = 0.4 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week.

How Profiling Works
Profiling now operates in all states as part of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment

Services (WPRS) system and is a two-step process. The first step excludes UI claimants
expecting recall by their previous employer and those who are members of full-referral union
hiring halls. In the second step, those who are most likely to exhaust UI benefits are identified.
Almost all states perform the second step using a statistical model that predicts the probability of
benefit exhaustion.
In statistical profiling models, the factors used to help predict exhaustion usually include
education, job tenure, change in employment in the prior industry and occupation, and the local
unemployment rate. When workers open a new claim for UI benefits, their personal and labor
market characteristics are entered into a profiling equation to predict their individual probability
of exhausting benefits. State WPRS systems then quickly refer those with a high predicted
probability to special reemployment assistance (Wandner 1997).
Profiling the Bonus
A recent study (O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998) has investigated the effects of
targeting reemployment bonus offers using profiling models and data from the Pennsylvania and
Washington experiments. Simulations were performed using 1) the actual profiling models used
in Pennsylvania and Washington since 1994 and 2) new models for each state estimated on the
control group data from the experiments using approximately the same prediction factors that are
currently used by the states. Target groups were defined by varying the threshold for making a
bonus offer between the 10th and 90th percentile in the distribution of predicted probability of
benefit exhaustion, and the effect on bonus impacts for different target groups was computed.
The findings suggest that targeting a reemployment bonus to claimants with high
exhaustion probabilities can yield larger reduction in UI payments than a nontargeted bonus, but
that targeting does not guarantee larger reductions. Furthermore, the use of a higher probability
threshold for targeting does not necessarily translate into larger UI reductions. Tables 1 and 2
summarize these results, which are based on profiling models estimated on data from the two
experiments and were somewhat stronger than, but similar in magnitude and direction to, those
estimated using the actual state models. In our estimates, the lower threshold (bonus offers to the
top 50 percent of beneficiaries, who are predicted as most likely to exhaust benefits) generally
yielded larger impacts on payments than targeting bonus offers to the top 25 percent (Table 1).
Hence, targeting with a modest probability threshold may maximize the impact of a bonus offer
on UI payments.
Cost-effectiveness
Previous examination of net benefits for reemployment bonus offers found more
favorable results as the perspective broadened from the UI system, to all government, to society
as a whole. The net benefits to the UI system of a reemployment bonus offer are the reduction in
UI benefit payments, minus the cost of bonus payments, minus any additional costs of
administering the bonus. Untargeted bonus offers have generally not been found to be costeffective from the crucial UI system perspective.

Table 2

Treatment
(bonus amt.,
qualif.
period)

Net Benefits to the UI System of
Reemployment Bonus Offers with and
without Profiling ($ saved per
claimant)
Full
sample

Top 50
percent

Top 25
percent

Pennsylvania
Low bonus,
short period

40

-119

-265

Low bonus,
long period

24

108

49

High bonus,
short period

-56

-138

-42

High bonus,
long period

-28

68

13

Declining
bonus

23

164

106

Washington
Low bonus,
short period

-62

-2

17

Low bonus,
long period

9

110

55

Medium
bonus, short
period

-88

6

14

Medium
bonus, long
period

-129

-141

-203

High bonus,
short period

-76

-97

-96

High bonus,
long period

-132

-94

-136

* Statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in a two-tailed test.
Pennsylvania bonus amount: low = 3 x WBA (weekly benefit amount); high = 6 x WBA; declining = half the remaining UI entitlement, with the
initial offer good for 2 weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week.
Pennsylvania qualification period: short = 6 weeks; long = 12 weeks.
Washington bonus amount: low = 2 x WBA; medium = 4 x WBA; high = 6 x WBA.
Washington qualification period: short = 0.2 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week; long = 0.4 x (potential UI duration) + 1 week.

Some bonus designs appear to consistently yield positive net benefits when targeted to

the 50 percent group; in particular, the targeted, long-qualification-period offers in Pennsylvania
are all estimated to be cost-effective (Table 2). For Washington, the treatment with the strongest
cost-effective results also had a long qualification period.
Targeting bonus offers to the top 25 percent most likely to exhaust benefits yielded the
same general pattern of results. However, narrowing the targeted group reduces the statistical
significance of impact estimates because sample sizes decline. Such narrowing also reduces the
net savings on UI payments in four out of five Pennsylvania treatments and in half of the
Washington treatments.
A reemployment bonus targeted to UI claimants who are permanently separated from
their prior employer and likely to exhaust their benefits is practical as a cost-effective early
intervention to promote reemployment. Results from the Pennsylvania and Washington
experiments suggest that a low bonus amount combined with a long qualification period targeted
to the 50 percent most likely to exhaust UI benefits is the best policy action.
Caveats
Targeting with profiling models improves the appeal of the reemployment bonus
program. However, two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-effectiveness in an
operational program (Meyer 1996). First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement
effect. Displacement occurs if UI claimants offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus. Second, there is the risk that a bonus
program could induce an entry effect, that is, the availability of a reemployment bonus might
result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers filing for UI.
If the entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost-effectiveness will
be lowered. However, since only some UI claimants would receive the bonus offer, targeting the
offers by profiling would introduce uncertainty about the offer, thereby reducing the chance of a
large entry effect. Targeting should also lower the potential for displacement by reducing the
share of UI claimants offered a bonus.
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